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In this paper, a tunnel threat at nuclear facilities is introduced as a case study. A tunnel threat detecting 
sensor-based physical security system is presented, and a real time alert of tunnel digging by adversaries 
around the nuclear facilities is illustrated. This paper also describes the system design for tunnel threat 
detection, geophone sensor-based detection techniques, and how to response to that threat through an 
alarm and wireless communication system. This study claims that tunnel threats are not yet considered in 
designing the physical protection systems at existing nuclear facilities. The proposed tunnel threat 
detection system is a timely approach to designing the robust physical protection system of nuclear 
facilities. The inclusion of tunnel threats along with other threats will no doubt enhance the nuclear 
security regime of nuclear installations. 
I. Introduction 
Worldwide emerging adversary groups are using innovative techniques to conduct terrorist activities. 
They are using state-of-the art technology and hacking tools. The peaceful uses of radioactive and nuclear 
materials for power generation, research, medicine, and industry solely depends on their safe and secured 
handling at all nuclear installations. But the possible threat is that potential adversaries such a terrorists, 
criminals, extremists, hackers and insiders may try to gain fissionable nuclear  (U-235, Pu-239) materials 
and/or radioactive materials (Cs-137, Co-60, Po- 210, Sr-90) for malicious purposes due to their 
ideological, economic and personal motivations. Often, the adversary groups clearly state their intention 
to inflict catastrophic casualties through making nuclear or radiological weapons with the capability of 
mass destruction. These terrorist activities are now a real and growing concern of the international 
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community and force the community to enhance nuclear security. The International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) states that between 1993 and 2013, 2477 nuclear incidences of illegal trafficking, theft or 
loss of nuclear and radiological materials are documented around the world of which only 40% has been 
recovered [1]. 
 
The prevention, detection of, and response to sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer, theft, or 
other dangerous activities involving nuclear materials, radioactive substances, or their associated facilities 
is known as nuclear security. 
 
The well-accepted nuclear security measures are physical protection systems, material control, and 
material accounting systems. Physical protection systems provide for the detection of any unauthorized 
penetration to barriers, portals and other security measures and trigger an immediate response to such 
penetrations, including the use of force if necessary. J. T.K. Mao and A Salvi present an approach to the 
design and installation of a plant security system in a nuclear power plant [2].V. Sequeira, et al. describe 
3D site modeling and verification of plant design for nuclear security applications [3]. Ryosuke Watabe, 
et al. propose security design of remote maintenance system for nuclear power plants [4]. 
 
Material control systems prevent illegal movement of materials and are provided for the prompt detection 
of theft or diversion of material. There are several techniques proposed including nuclear forensics and 
nuclear material detection to prevent the transport and use of nuclear materials [5–12]. Material 
accounting systems ensure that all materials are accounted for, enabling the measurement of losses and 
providing information for follow-up investigations of irregularities. 
 
Nuclear terrorism is the use of nuclear or radioactive materials by adversaries to cause fear or to achieve 
political aims. Nuclear terrorism may also include radioactive materials used in medical, industrial, 
scientific research applications, and nuclear waste. A dirty bomb might be developed by the dispersal of 
these materials [13]. Sabotage of a nuclear facility is yet another form of nuclear terrorism [14–16]. 
Nuclear terrorism could be represented in several ways such as the use of a nuclear weapon, radiological 
terrorism, and nuclear or radiological sabotage [17–20]. 
 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) develops the design basis threat (DBT) based on its 
regular interactions with law enforcement authorities and federal intelligence. The design basis threat 
describes general characteristics of adversaries such as terrorists, criminals, extremists, hackers, and 
insiders that nuclear facilities must defend against to prevent threats to nuclear facilities. 
 
Recent terrorist events have served as an impetus for the development of an array of new nuclear security 
regulation. Although malicious acts involving nuclear installations is not new, recent terrorist events have 
demonstrated that an attack on a nuclear facility might be undertaken and that terrorists have terrific 
capabilities and dedication. Recently, terrorist are showing their willingness to inflict mass casualties and 
announcing their intention to acquire nuclear materials. Particularly after September 11, 2001, protecting 
nuclear power reactors against terrorist groups worldwide has attracted the crucial attention of security 
and technical/scientist analysts. This has led to an increased focus on defense against terrorists at nuclear 
facilities as well as at other critical infrastructures. So it is imperative to find the new potential threats to 
nuclear facilities and to develop regulations. 
 
Digging tunnels under the ground of nuclear facilities presents a threat to both military and law 
enforcement of a country. Criminals with intentions of avoiding border security have turned tunnels into 
transit routes for trafficking weapons, people, drugs, and other illegal materials. Many times prisoners 
have used underground tunnels to escape the prison. While drug and human trafficking have long been 
border concerns, the threat of international terrorism has transformed the effort to detect tunnels into a 
national security priority. 
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Terrorist attacks through tunneling are not new events or tactics. There are several examples of such 
events around the world. About 150 tunnels were discovered around the US-Mexico border, which were 
being used to smuggle drugs and other illegal items [21]. Hezbollah and Hamas in Gaza have been using 
tunnels for quite some time to smuggle weapons and launch attacks against Israel. Tunnel bombs are also 
emerging as a threat to global security. In Iraq ISIS is using tunnel bombs to blow up buildings and other 
targets. In Syria several of these tunnel bombs were detonated [22].To this extent, nuclear facilities might 
face such tunnel threats in the future, and it should be a significant concern for regulators and operators. 
As far we know, this type of threat is not yet considered in designing the physical protection system (PPS) 
of nuclear power plants or any other nuclear facilities. This can be considered a potential threat when 
design basis threat (DBT) is analyzed. 
 
The objective of this paper is to address the tunnel threat at nuclear facilities and to provide a tunnel threat 
detection-based security system to nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities. 
 
In this paper, we describe a tunnel threat detection-based security system, which is well suited to detect 
tunnel threats as well as to provide real-time alerts of digging. This paper is arranged by describing 
system design for tunnel threat detection in section II; the detection procedure in section III; the response 
to the threat in section IV; and the conclusion in section V. The threat assessment procedure of the total 
system is described in the next section. 
II. System architecture for tunnel threat detection 
Underground tunnels can be a potential threat for nuclear power plants, research reactors, and hospitals 
where nuclear materials and radioactive sources are kept. It is necessary to find a way to detect and 
neutralize this threat. 
 
In our tunnel threat detection system, we have shown that the central alarm station (CAS) at the protected 
area gets signals from the underground tunnel detection sensors outside of the controlled area. Figure 1 
shows the graded approach to the tunnel threat detecting security system for physical protection of a 
nuclear power plant. In Fig.1, the CAS, which is located in the protected area of the nuclear power plant, 
gets information about tunnel threats from the tunnel detection sensors through a signal-processing device 
at the controlled area. 
 
In Fig.1, the tunnel detection sensors are located outside the controlled area and completely surround it. 
These tunnel detection sensors will be inserted into the ground. According to the tunnel detection range of 
the sensors as well as our acceptable range, the sensors are inserted at a certain depth into the ground. 
These tunnel detection sensors are placed at distance from each other so that the detection range will 
overlap which increases the tunnel detection capability. With any signal from underground, the tunnel 
detection sensor gives a particular response to the signal-processing device. 
 
The signal processing devices are placed inside the controlled area as shown in Fig.1. In the signal-
processing device, the signal produced in the tunnel detection sensor is processed in real time using an 
advanced algorithm. The signal processing devices will typically take the form of a small, weatherproof 
box, mounted on the ground. One signal-processing device receives signals from a multiple numbers of 
sensors closest to it and a number of signal processing devices are used to cover all the sensors. In Fig.1, 
we have showed four signal processing devices. 
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The signal processing devices transmit the signal to the CAS situated in the protected area. In this tunnel 
threat detecting security system as shows in Fig.1, there are two possible ways to transmit signals, 
including through wired and wireless transmission to the CAS from signal processing devices. Figure1 
shows that the CAS receives signals from all of the signal processing devices. 
 
The transmitter associated with the signal-processing device transmits the data to the CAS. There is an 
alternative way for data transmission. This is in case a technical problem occurs. For example, if the 
transmitter were damaged. By using Ethernet or some other wired system, data can be transmitted to the 
central alarm station. With the data, a notification will be sent to the CAS relaying that the transmitter 
needs to be fixed so that steps can be taken to fix it. The CAS is a room which houses the monitors for the 
security equipment, terminals to the access control computer, and emergency communication equipment. 
The CAS monitors all the security issues in the nuclear power plant. The CAS analyzes the signals from 
the tunnel threat detection sensors through the signal processing devices. When any tunnel threat is 
detected, the CAS will generate an alarm and inform security personnel about the tunnel threat as well as 
the tunnel threat location. 
 
The overall layout of our tunnel threat detecting security system is presented in Fig. 2. Figure 2 depicts 
three tunnel threat-detecting sensors, which receive signals from underground tunnel activity and send the 
signals to a signal-processing device. After preprocessing the received signal, the signal-processing 
device sends it to the CAS via wireless transmitter or wired connection. The antenna then receives the 
signal and sends it to the CAS. This antenna also can broadcast alert messages to security personnel. 
Figure 1.Graded approach for the tunnel threat detecting security system 
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Figure 2.Overall layout of the tunnel threat detecting security system 
In this tunnel threat detecting security system, the CAS receives signals of tunnel threats from tunnel 
detection sensors through signal processing devices and takes the required steps to handle the threat, 
which is shown as block diagram in Fig. 3. 
 
 
III. Detection Procedure 
The detection procedure of this tunnel threat detecting security system can be described in three stages of 
detection: the response of the tunnel detection sensors; the preprocessing of the signals from the sensors at 
signal processing device; and the threat signal detection at CAS. 
 
In tunnel threat detecting sensors, geophone-based seismic sensors are placed into the ground. They 
would be adjustable to various types of terrain e.g. sand, clay, soil, etc. A geophone is a ground motion 
transducer. It converts ground movements into voltage. A typical geophone is manufactured by hanging a 
mass by a spring. With the application of a velocity at frequencies lesser than the resonance frequency, 
the geophone housing and the hanging mass start moving. If frequencies are greater than the resonance 
frequency, the mass will remain stationary. The motion of mass is based on either magnets or coils. The 
response of a magnet or coil geophone is proportional to the ground velocity. A basic schematic drawing 
of a tunnel threat-detecting sensor is shown in Fig. 4. 
Figure 3. Block diagram of the tunnel threat detection system 
5
Ahmed: Addressing the Tunnel Threat at Nuclear Facilities:  A Case Study
International Journal of Nuclear Security, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2016 
 
Figure 4. Schematic drawing of a tunnel threat-detecting sensor. 
 
When an activity is registered within the area, the tunnel threat-detecting sensor produces a signal that is 
analyzed in real time using computer algorithms to identify the type of registered activity. The geophones 
can be installed at varying depths and distances from each other. Each geophone has an adjustable 
detection range that can usually be overlapped by some units to increase reliability. By design, the 
installation of sensors can be divided into the areas of revelation. In this method, a tunnel threat-detecting 
sensor responds to tunneling activity. The schematic diagram of the tunnel threat detection method is 
shown in Fig. 5. Figure 5 shows that signals from the tunneling activity spread all around the 
underground, and the sensors near the tunnel respond to the signal. 
 
 
Figure 5. Detection method for tunnel threat 
 
Preprocessing of the signals from the sensors is done at the signal-processing device where advanced 
intrusion recognition algorithms can be adopted to analyze the seismic signals to effectively filter out the 
false alarms. This is so the unwanted noise cannot interrupt the original tunnel threat signal, which is 
shown in Fig. 6. This smart signal processing will provide a high possibility of detection and an extremely 
low false and nuisance alarm rate. 
 
At the CAS, a computerized system will further process the digital signals (Digital Signal Processing 
(DSP)) picked from the signal-processing device and display the results over the monitors of the CAS. A 
system can also be developed to send massages to the cellular phones of security personnel. When a 
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Figure 6. Signal detection system for tunnel threat 
IV. Response To 
A computer collects the data and analyzes it in real time. By using advanced computer algorithms, it is 
possible to differentiate between a real threat and a false alarm. This differentiation is required because it 
might be caused by an animal or a pedestrian whose movement triggered the alarm. To confirm the threat, 
real drones or quad-copters controlled from CAS can be used to inspect the location where activity is 
detected. Drones can inspect the area of occurrence by using ground-penetrating radar (GPR). Drones can 
also be used to check for any signs of explosives or weapons. Security personnel near the location of 
occurrence can also perform this. If the detected threat is real, the system will automatically trigger the 
alarm and indicate the level of threat, which will help security personnel take immediate action to locate 
the site where the threat is detected and take proper measure to neutralize the threat. 
 
To facilitate this action, computer programs can be written which will locate and send an automatically 
generated alert message containing the location of the area in which the threat has occurred to security 
personnel, nearest to the area of occurrence. By using this procedure, time and resources can be saved. 
V. Conclusion 
In order to prevent, prohibit, and respond to malicious acts involving radioactive materials, nuclear 
materials, and their associated facilities, this paper introduces a new possible threat termed as ‘tunnel 
threat’ to nuclear facilities and describes a tunnel threat detecting security system. This tunnel threat 
detection system can easily be interfaced with the CAS of nuclear facilities. The geophone sensor-based 
tunnel threat detecting system can be considered a reliable system. In this system, we have proposed the 
use of drones for further site inspections in order to identify the exact location of the threat as a counter 
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measure. To respond immediately against the tunnel threat received from the CAS, the message could be 
forwarded to the security personnel using the broadcasting antenna. This study claims that tunnel threats 
should be taken into account with the design basis threat (DBT). Hence, designing physical security 
systems at nuclear installations needs to address tunnel threats along with other threats in order to enhance 
the nuclear security regime. 
VI. Works Cited 
1.  IAEA, Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) (2013), (available at http://www-
ns.iaea.org/security/itdb.asp). 
2.  J. T. K. Mao, A. Salvi, Design Considerations and Features for a Nuclear Power Plant Security 
System. IEEE Trans. Power Appar. Syst.PAS-100, 4493–4501 (1981). 
3.  V. Sequeira, G. Bostrom, M. Fiocco, D. Puig, J. G. M. Goncalves, in 2005 IEEE Computer Society 
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR’05) - Workshops (2005), pp. 127–
127. 
4.  R. Watabe, T. Oi, Y. Endo, in SICE, 2007 Annual Conference (2007), pp. 1700–1704. 
5.  E. Peskie, H. Hall, Radiation Damage as a Possible Metal Chronometer for Pre-Detonation Nuclear 
Forensics. Int. J. Nucl. Secur.1 (2015), doi:10.7290/V7W66HPT. 
6.  E. Peskie, H. Hall, Impurity Diffusion as a Possible Metal Chronometer for Pre-Detonation Nuclear 
Forensics. Int. J. Nucl. Secur.1 (2015), doi:10.7290/V7RF5RZ3. 
7.  H. Gowadia, B. Mardigras, The Department of Homeland Security’s Approach to Countering 
Nuclear Terrorism through Detection and Technical Forensics. Int. J. Nucl. Secur.1 (2015), 
doi:10.7290/V7V985ZR. 
8.  H. Yang, D. K. Wehe, in 2009 IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium Conference Record (NSS/MIC) 
(2009), pp. 898–903. 
9.  J. A. Webster, Tensioned Metastable Fluid Detectors in Nuclear Security for Active Interrogation of 
Special Nuclear Materials―Part B. World J. Nucl. Sci. Technol.1, 66–76 (2011). 
10.  T. Köble, W. Rosenstock, M. Risse, J. Engelen-Peter, “Detecting Fissionable Material from a 
Travelling Vehicle by Neutron Coincidence Measurement,” INMM 43rd Annual Meeting (Orlando, 
FL, 2002). 
11.  T. Köble, W. Rosenstock, M. Risse, J. Peter, “Detection of Nuclear Material During Fast Road 
Transport,” INMM 44th Annual Meeting (Phoenix, AZ, 2003). 
12.  W. Rosenstock, W. Berky, S. Chmel, H. Friedrich, T. Köble, M. Risse, “Covert Search and 
Detection of Illicit Nuclear as Well as Radioactive Material” (Fraunhofer-Verbund Verteidigungs-
und Sicherheitsforschung VVS, Karlsruhe, Germany, 2009), pp. 176–185. 
13.  M. Bunn, Securing the Bomb (Harvard University, USA, 2008; 
http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/18672/securing_the_bomb_2008.html). 
14.  The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (2004), (available at 
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Code-2004_web.pdf). 
8
International Journal of Nuclear Security, Vol. 2 [2016], No. 3, Art. 10
International Journal of Nuclear Security, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2016 
15.  IAEA, “The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, INFCIRC/274/Rev.1” 
(Vienna, Austria, 1980), (available at https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc274r1.pdf). 
16.  IAEA, “Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, IAEA Safety Standards Series 
No. RS-G-1.9” (2005), (available at http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1225_web.pdf). 
17.  IAEA, “Categorization of Radioactive Sources,” IAEA Safety Standards Series No. RS-G-1.9 
(Vienna, Austria, 2005), (available at http://www-
pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/7237/Categorization-of-Radioactive-Sources). 
18.  IAEA, “Physical Protection Objectives and Fundamental Principles, GOV/2001/41” (GOV/2001/41, 
Vienna, Austria, 2001), (available at 
https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC45/Documents/gc45inf-14.pdf). 
19.  IAEA, “Nuclear Security Culture,” Nuclear Security Series No. 7 (Vienna, Austria, 2008), 
(available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/7977/Nuclear-Security-Culture). 
20.  IAEA, “The Design Basis Threat”, Nuclear Security Series No. 10, Vienna, Austria, 2009. 
21.  T. Sanchez, U.S. and Israel Unite to Fight Border Tunnel Threats. Truth Revolt (2015), (available at 
http://www.truthrevolt.org/news/us-and-israel-unite-fight-border-tunnel-threats). 
22.  M. Weisgerber, ISIS Is Using Tunnel Bombs in Iraq. Def. One (2015), (available at 
http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/06/isis-using-tunnel-bombs-iraq/114730/). 
VII. Authors’ Bio and Contact Information 
Md. Mobasher Ahmed - is a M.S. student at Department of Nuclear Engineering, University of Dhaka, 
Dhaka-1000, Bangladesh. Contact: md.mobasher@gmail.com 
 
Omar Ahmed - is a M.S. student at Department of Nuclear Engineering, University of Dhaka, Dhaka-
1000, Bangladesh. Contact: omarahmed8923@gmail.com 
 
Dr. Md. Shafiqul Islam - PhD. in Thermalhydraulics in Nuclear Reactors, Saga University, Japan is an 
Associate Professor, Department of Nuclear Engineering, University of Dhaka, Dhaka 1000, Bangladesh. 
He has broad experiences in thermalhydraulics and is skilled in heat transfer & fluid flow characteristics. 
He has about eight years work experiences on research reactor operation and maintenance activities, 
nuclear reactor safety, security and safeguards matters during his past job at Bangladesh Atomic Energy 
Commission (BAEC). He has participated on nuclear safety, security and safeguards related technical 
meetings, workshops, and seminars at IAEA, USA, Japan, and Canada. He can be reached at 
msislam@du.ac.bd 
9
Ahmed: Addressing the Tunnel Threat at Nuclear Facilities:  A Case Study
